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DEBT PROBLEMS AND FARM RECONSTRUCTION IN AUSTRALIA 
J.P. MAKEHAM 
Senior Lecturer in Agricultural Economics, University of New England 
The Present Debt and Income Position 
Most estimates of the current debt situation in Australian agriculture in-
dicate that at least 12¥2% or 30,000 of Australia's 240,000 farmers have little 
prospect of economic survival because, on present and expected future prices, 
they are unable to meet annual interest and principal repayments. 
Another 12¥2%- 15% are in the 'doubtful' category i.e. their future 
viability is dependent on receiving financial assistance on far more liberal 
terms than are available commercially. Even with concessional finance, a 
number of these farmers are not viable. 
The remaining 70% a,re presently viable but on projected trends in costs 
and prices, it is expected that some of these will also have difficulty in meet-
ing debt obligations. 
The sheep industry is currently the most seriously affected. In 1970-71, 
between 40,000 and 45,000 of the nation's 90,000 wool producers had net 
farm incomes less than $2,000. After debt servicing committments have been 
taken into account, another 5,000 to 10,000 producers can be added to the 
list. (The average wage in Australia is $4,000 per year). 
It should be remembered, however, that over the 17 years during which 
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics has been surveying the sheep industry, 
there has always been a significant number of producers with incomes less 
than $2,000 per year, so that the problem of low incomes in the industry is 
not new. However, the present numbers oflow income producers is the high-
est ever recorded, and it is difficult to see much improvement in the level of 
product prices which they will receive. The net farm income of some will 
improve through diversification. 
A number of tables prepared by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
are attached as appendices, and we will now refer to them. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the projected trends of returns, costs and farm in-
come to 1974-75, whilst tables 3(a) and 3(b) show the level of rural debt and 
the ratio of rural debt to farm income. The rural debt figure understates the 
true debt position because it takes no account of private loans. Table 4 shows 
that over the last 3 years the rural sector has changed from being a net lender 
to the banking system to being a net borrower. Table 5 gives details of the 
lenders to the rural sector, and table 6 shows which industries were the major 
borrowers. 
The difficulty which a number of primary producers are having in servic-
ing debt can be partly understood when we consider the percentage of farm-
ers in various industries whose net farm income is less than $2,000 per year. 
Percentage of Australian Farmers with Net Farm Incomes 
Less than $2,000 Per Year in 1969-70, by Farming Zones 
Sheep-Wheat Zone 30% Dried Vines 35% 
High Rainfall Sheep 33% Citrus 50% 
Wheat Zone 20% 
Pastoral Sheep 60% 
Dairy (Manufacturing) 40% 
(Whole Milk Sector) 30% 
Canned Fruit 40% 
Potatoes 50% 
Banana 
Berry Fruit 
Apple and Pear 
Peanut 
70% 
80% 
50% 
20% 
We can question the value of a net farm income figure of $2,000 as an 
indicator of viability, since it appears that many farmers can stay in business 
even though they earn less than $2,000. Even so, it would appear difficult to 
service debt, living expenses and new capital investment on an income of less 
than $2,000 per year. 
Background to the Present Debt Situation 
Apart from the familiar cost-price squeeze, plus the large increases in 
production which have been brought about by the adoption of new tech-
nology, (output has doubled over the past two decades), as well as the slow 
growth or decline in demand for a number of products, drought and develop-
ment of new areas have been responsible for the serious financial problems of 
a number of producers. 
Drought has had its main impact in the pastoral zone, where it is estim-
ated that 3,000 wool producers (of a population of 8,000) are facing bank-
ruptcy due to drought, often of 5-6 years duration, and lower wool prices. 
Tables 7 and 8 indicate the impact of drought and declining wool prices on 
debt per dry sheep equivalent and equity ratio in Queensland. The situation 
is also serious in parts of the pastoral zones of South Australia, Western 
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Australia and New South Wales. There is little scope for diversification or 
intensification in the pastoral zone. 
The settlement of new areas, especially in the better rainfall zones of 
Western Australia and the Northern Tablelands of New South Wales, has also 
caused a number of financial disasters. These areas have been developed over 
the past 8-10 years; the settlers generally had insufficient starting capital and 
they also borrowed heavily for development. A combination of declining 
product prices, wheat quotas, and drought, together with a marked drop in 
land values has 
(a) reduced annual cash flow to the point where it is no longer possible 
to service borrowings 
(b) reduced equity levels so that further financing on any reasonable 
terms is not possible. 
Table 9 shows the position for Western Australia. A similar situation 
exists among recent settlers on the Northern Tablelands of New South Wales. 
In the older settled areas of the high rainfall zone, and in the more fav-
oured parts of the sheep-wheat and dairy zones, intensification and diversi-
fication have allowed the majority of producers to keep pace with, and in 
some cases, outstrip the income depressing effects of the cost-price squeeze. 
But there is a physical and economic limit to increased productivity, 
and many producers who adopted the stocking rate technology have discov-
ered the flat nature of the curve which relates gross margins and stocking 
rates once a reasonable degree of utilization has been achieved. Also, our 
studies at the University of New England have shown that the economics of 
borrowing for development by sheep and beef producers with equities less 
than 80% can be very questionable, especially if the development costs are at 
all expensive. Finally, there is nothing in the pipeline equivalent to the 
pasture improvement and stocking rate revolution which is likely to improve 
producer's positions. 
What Measures are being taken to cope with the Present Debt Problem? 
The Federal Government has allocated $100 millio.n over the next 4 
years for Rural Reconstruction, which is only about 3% of annual net farm 
income. Half of the money is available at 4% for long term finance to allow 
purchase of adjoining or nearby properties for farm build up. As well the 
legislation provides for a meagre loan of up to $1,000 to farmers who wish 
to leave the land and make a start elsewhere. Recent indications are that this 
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loan will form part of a comprehensive retraining programme sponsored by 
the Department of Labour and National Service. 
In addition to the $1 00 million Rural Reconstruction fund, funds have 
been allocated for marginal dairy farm reconstruction; the main objective in 
this scheme is to finance farm build up, and where necessary, to underwrite 
the cost of writing off redundant assets in the newly amalgamated unit. There 
is a similar provision for writing off surplus assets in the Rural Reconstruc-
tion scheme. The dairy reconstruction scheme will cost $11.5 million in loans . 
and write offs this year. 
. 
The Commonwealth Development Bank has also been authorized to 
lend up to $10 million for fanh amalga~ation. . 
A study of the rural debt situation, and evidence from the recently 
formed State Rural Reconstruction agencies indicates that the potential de-
mand for long term finance exceeds the $100 million allocated, by many 
times over, and the Minister has indicated that requests for more funds will 
be favourably considered. But the charter under which the reconstruction 
agencies have to operate means that assistance can only be given to those 
who have good prospects of becoming viable if the concessional finance is 
given.At present, this means a high rejection rate-at least 3 out of 4 in most 
States. In Western Australia 98% of applications have sought assistance for 
loan restructuring as distinct from help for farm build up; other States' ex-
perience indicate a similar preference. In the present atmosphere of uncer-
tainty about the medium term future of agriculture, most people are reluct-
ant to commit themselves to long term debt for property purchase, although 
they are happy to accept assistance to have the terms of repayment of exist-
ing debt made more favourable. 
What about Income Support? 
The recent decision to subsidize the Australian clip for one year so that 
it averages 36c per pound came as rather a surprise, as both Liberal and 
Labor Party thinking had tended to move away from the use of subsidies as 
a device to alleviate the ecnomic problems of industries in trouble. However, 
the Country Party section of the coalition was able to force the measure 
through. One of the arguments for support of this nature is based on such 
figures as are shown in table 10. It is likely that support will extend beyond 
one year, as there seems to be no such thing as a temporary subsidy. 
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The cost will be from $60 to $120 million per yer, depending on the 
price of wool The latest outlook reports on wool prices, made before Presi-
dent Nixon's recent announcement indicate that wool prices would rise, so 
that the cost may not reach the $120 million mark. 
The subsidy will not be of a great deal of assistance to the small and 
medium sized wool grower. Thirteen per cent of growers will receive 60% of 
the subsidy, whereas a grower producing say 30 bales at 28c now would re-
ceive only about $600. 
A good deal of the subsidy will simply be a transfer payment to banks 
and stock firms for debt reduction. 
As well as a direct subsidy for wool the Government will pick up the 
tab on any losses from the activities in the market place of the Australian 
Wool Commission (estimated at $4 million) and provide $3.7 million towards 
the cost involved in handling wool under the Price Averaging Plan, which is a 
scheme to eliminate small lots offered for auction. The Wool Commission cur-
rently holds 339,000 bales bought in at a cost of $33 million, which is 6% 
of last years' wool clip and 2% of total world wool production. 
The dairy industry will receive a subsidy of approximately $40 million, 
wheat $27 million, fertilizer subsidies $48 million. The total direct assistance 
to primary industry will be between $275 million and $325 million, depend-
ing on the price of wool. Net farm income will be around $800 million, so 
that direct assistance amounts to 37% of net farm income. 
Perhaps the direct assistance to agriculture of some $300 million is not 
quite so frightening when we consider that over $1250 million will be spent 
on defence. 
Decline in Land Values 
There has been a decline in land values of at least 30% on values of 3 
years ago in the high rainfall sheep zone, in the sheep-wheat zone and of 40% 
or more in many parts of the pastoral zone. The volume of land sales has de-
clined, and there are many more willing sellers at these depressed values than 
there are buyers. There has been no significant drop in values in the better 
favoured dairying areas of Victoria and coastal New South Wales, and there 
has been an increase in values in Queensland and Norther Territory beef 
zones. The absence of an effective market for property purchase is preventing 
many people from selling out and leaving agriculture. There have been sug-
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gestions of that the Government should set up a authority to purchase farms 
of those who can't find a buyer, but this measure would be most expensive 
and also difficult to administrate. Consequently, it is not likely to be accept-
ed by Government. 
One result of the sluggish and depressed market for land has been an 
increase in leasehold arrangements. This form of tenure was very important 
in facilitating adjustment in the United States and it appears to have a useful 
role to play in Australia. 
Off-Farm Movement 
At the moment, there is not a great deal of off-farm movement in the 
wool industry. Most producers are sitting tight and hoping that the terms of 
debt reconstruction will be liberalized so that the rejection rate can be lower-
ed, that the Government will continue to subsidize wool, that market reform 
and an upturn in the economics of wool consuming countries will lead to im-
proved wool returns, and generally, that things will come right in a few years. 
The projections of Table 1 do not support such an optimistic view of prices 
in the medium term. 
At the moment, there are no massive forecloseures by creditors, forcing 
people to leave their farms, because the banks and stock firms would be un-
able to dispose of the properties even if they repassed them; also, they fear 
that such a step would further reduce land values and hence reduce both 
theirs and the farmers' equity in the property. There is also a marked reluct-
ance of farmers to move to off-farm jobs, especially as the incentives to do 
so are not great. 
In a few cases, creditors have had to write off part of the debt as a pen-
alty for their unwise lending policies in the past. It is likely thu.t they will be 
faced with further write off in the future. Whilst there is as yet no marked 
exodus of wool growers from the industry, for the reasons I have listed above, 
there has been a general decline in the numbers of those engaged in agricul-
ture. For example, in the dairying industry, parts of which ran into a low 
income problem a number of years ago, the current rate of decline in regis-
tered dairies is approximately 3,000 per year. Many of these people have 
left the industry, whilst the remainder have diversified into beef production, 
often combined with off-farm employment. 
The total employment in the rural sector, in male man year equivalents, 
has declined from 455,000 in 1954 to 377,00 in 1967. Thus the process of 
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off-farm migration has been occurring even at a time of relatively buoyant 
prices. 
The Future 
Even though there is a significant and growing 'tail' of low income pro-
ducers in Australian agriculture, and medium term projections indicate a de-
cline in net farm income, the majority (at least 60%) of producers are still in 
a sound financial position and will be so in the forseeable future. 
Government policies of assistance do not go nearly far enough to make 
it easy for the low income producer to move to other occupations; in fact 
the policies seem designed partly to keep people on the land. 
Farmers are most unwilling to forgo their familiar way of life for non-
rural occupations, but the pressures arising from increased costs and depress-
ed product prices will make this course inevitable for an increasing number. 
As Australia now settles 140,000 migrants per year, it should not be 
too hard to provide for the relocation and retraining of a total of 30-40,000 
farmers. 
There is considerable room for rationalization of many of our agricul-
tural industries; for example, the average labour input throughout the indus-
try is one man per 1630 sheep. Waring, of the B.A.E., estimates that if the 
industry could be reorganized so that every person looked after 163 0 sheep, 
some 45,000 men would be released from the industry. 
Whilst there are no major new technological developments available 
from research now or in the medium term, there is still a place for the pro-
fitable adoption of existing technology on many farms. However the scope 
for this is less, the costs are greater, and the profitability more questionable 
than formerly. 
I leave it to you to decide whether Australian policies to cope with 
farm debt and low incomes in agriculture are appropriate and/or feasible in 
New Zealand. 
Finally I pose the question as to whether policies which have their main 
emphasis on increasing physical productivity are adequate to handle the ad-
justment problems of agriculture in a well developed economy. 
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Table 1 
Gross Fann 
Year Returns CostJa) Income 
$m $m $m 
1965-66 3,347 2,286 1,061 
1966-67 3.828 2,455 1,373 
1967-68 3,345 2,522 823 
1968-69 (preliminary) 3,956 2,711 1,245 
1969-7 0 (estimated) 3,773 2,741 1,032 
1974-75 (projected 4,000 3,140 860 
(a) In this paper the estimate of farm costs includes depreciation calculated at concessional rates 
used fo~ taxation purposes. This tends to overstate costs and consequently understate income. 
Although this affects the aggregate net farm income figure it does not affect the direction of 
change in income. · 
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Table 2 
VOLUME AND VALUE OF PRODUCTION 
ESTIMATES FOR 1969-70 and PROJECTIONS FOR 1974-75 
SELECTED COMMODITIES 
Volume of Production Value of Production 
Commodity Unit 1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 
$m $m 
Crops-
Wheat m. bu 398.1 350.0 550.0 485.0 
Coarse Grains 
Barley m. bu 78.9 80.0 66.2 68.0 
Oats ··m. bu 80.0 99.0 43.3 59.0 
Maize m. bu 7.4 10.0 9.1 13.0 
Sorghum m. bu 11.0 27.0 10.0 28.0 
132.6 168.0 
Rice (paddy '000 tons 239.5 320.0 10.4 15.3 
Sugar (94 n.t.) m. tons 2.2 2.4 142.0 158.3 
Dried Vine Fruit '000 tons 92.2 98 28.3 30.2 
Deciduous Fruits 
'000 tons 218.0 224.5 22.2 19.5 Used for Canning 
Apples '000 tons 368.3 431.0 51.3 55.0 
Livestock Product 
Wool m.lb 2,046 2,325 746.0 907.0 
Wholemilk m. gal 1.660 1,700 414.0 430.0 
Beef and Veal '000 tons 1,012 1,200 629.4 663.6 
Mutton and Lamb '000 tons 762 805 201.5 183.0 
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Table 3A 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RURAL DEBT AND FARM INCOME 
AND NET VALUE OF RURAL PRODUCTION: SELECTED YEARS 
Year Ended 30 June 
Item 1939 1949 1959 1969 
$m $m $m $m 
Farm Income (a) 88 606 963 
Net Value of Rural Production 294 989 1,887 2,855 
Rural Debt (b) 570 414 926 1,963 
% % % % 
Ratios of RuraJ Debt to: 
Farm Income 648 68 96 158 
Net Value of Rural Production 194 42 49 69 
(a) Income of farm 
1970 
$m 
1,032 
2,679 
2,087 
% 
202 
78 
(b) Estimated mral trading banks, Development Bank, pastoral finance 
companies, Assurance Societies and other Government Agencies. 
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Bulletin, various issues; 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Primary Industries Bulletin, 
various issues; 
Australian National Accounts, various issues. 
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Table 3B 
INTERNAL CASH FLOW OFF ARMERS, RURAL INDEBTEDNESS AND INDICATORS OF FARM INVESTMENT 
Rural Indebtedness 
Internal Gross Indebtedness Farmers' Holdings of Net Rural Indebted-
Year Cash Flow(a) to Major Institutional Liquid Assets (b) (d) ness to Major Instu- · 
Lenders (b) (c) tional Lenders (b) 
$m $m $m $m 
1960-61 1,312 991 855 136 
1961-62 1,247 1,048 85.2 196 
1962-63 1,454 1,085 893 192 
1963-64 1,795 1,148 903 155 
1964-65 1,690 1,301 950 351 
1965-66 1,447 1,411 943 468 
1966-67 1,791 1,604 972 632 
1967-68 1,266 1,872 885 987 
1968..;_69 1,700(f) 1,963 935 1,028 
1969-70 1,542(f) 2,087 870 (f) 1 ,217 (f) 
(a) Farm income plus depreciation allowances: the latter which were $300m in 1960-61, rose with fluctuations to 
$331m in 1965-66 and an estimated $510m in 1969-70. 
(b) Estimated as at end of year. 
(c) Includes indebtedness to hire purchase companies, trade creditors and private lenders. 
(d) Deposits with major trading banks and pastoral finance companies and holdings of Commonwealth Government 
securities. 
(e) Includes expenditure in the trapping, forestry, fishing and whaling industries. 
(f) Estimated by B.A.E., n.a., not available. 
Sources: Commonwealth Statistician, Reserve Bank of Australia and Department of Primary Industry. 
Table 4 
BANK ADVANCES TO AND DEPOSITS OF RURAL INDUSTRIES: 
MAJOR TRADING BANKS 
Bank Bank Advances as a 
Year Advances Deposits Proportion of 
Deposits 
$m $m % 
1959 (a) 459 670 69 
1960 (a) 474 689 69 
1961 (b) 451 655 69 
1962 (b) 479 665 72 
1963 (b) 495 713 69 
1964 (b) 514 815 63 
1965 (b) 584 791 74 
1966 (b) 650 801 81 
1967 (b) 751 833 90 
1968 (b) 918 764 120 
1969 (b) 939 814 115 
1970 (b) 998 756 132 
(a) As at 30 June 
(b) As at second Wednesday of July. n.a., not available. 
Source: Re$erve Ba!lk of Australia, Statistical Bulletin, various issues. 
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Table 5 
GROSS RURAL INDEBTEDNESS TO MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL LENDERS 
AUSTRALIA 
Major Pastoral Commonwealth Ex-Service Other Total At 30th Assurance Gross 
June (a) Trading Finance Development Societies Settlement Government Indebtedness Banks(b) Companies Bank Schemes Agencies (c) (d) 
$m $m $m $m $m $m $m 
1958 471.8 185.8 11.6 32.0 100.0 124.4 925.6 
1959 459.2 182.6 12.0 34.0 106.2 129.2 923.4 
1960 473.4 203.9 13.6 42.0 110.8 134.0 977.7 
1961 450.4 212.9 21.6 48.0 114.1 143.8 990.8 
1962 479.4 208.0 34.8 51.0 117.6 156.9 1047.7 
-
1963 494.6 213.7 45.0 52.0 113.2 166.2 1084.7 
w 
1964 514.8 228.3 55.3 56.0 107.9 186.0 1148.3 
1965 583.8 258.9 71.6 65.0 104.3 217.6 1301.2 
1966 650.4 249.9 92.2 75.0 98.9 244.6 1411.0 
1967 750.6 285.5 120.1 81.0 92.2 274.5 1603.9 
1968 918.2 314.4 142.9 97.0 88.4 311.1 1872.0 
1969 938.5 337.7 161.8 115.0 84.9 325.2 1963.1 
1970 998.0 349.1 175.9 130.0 79.9 354.0 2086.9 
(a) From 1961 figures for the major trading banks refer to the second Wednesday in July. All other figures relate to 
30th June. 
(b) Includes advances from Term Loan Fund and Farm Development Loan Fund. 
(c) Includes advances by State Banks 
(d) Excluding indebtedness to the purchase companies, trade creditors and private lenders. 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Table 6 
ADVANCES TO SELECTED RURAL INDUSTRiES BY 
MAJOR TRADING BANKS: SELECTED YEARS 
Industry 
Mainly Sheep 
Mainly Wheat 
Mainly Dairy and Pigs 
Other 
Total 
All Rural Industries 
(a) As at 31 December 
1949(a) 
% 
34.7 
13.3 
27.0 
25.0 
100.0 
$m 
217.1 
1959(a) 1960(b) 
Percentage of Advances Outstanding 
% % 
49.5 44.1 
7.9 14.0 
19.2 13.2 
23.4 28.7 
100.0 100.0 
Total Value of Advances Outstanding 
$m $m 
445.3 916.3 
(b) As at second Wednesday of January 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Bulletin, various issues. 
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1970(b) 
% 
42.9 
13.9 
12.3 
30.9 
100.0 
$m 
945.8 
Table 7 
DISTRIBUTION OF PASTORAL FINANCE COMPANY CLIENTS IN FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES 
BY PERCENTAGE OF SHEEP REMAINING: BY DEBT PER SHEEP EQUIVALENT REMAINING: 
QUEENSLAND PASTORAL ZONE 
Debt per Sheep Equivalent Remaining (a) 
$0 $4 $8 $12 $16 $20 $24 
Percentage and and and and and and and $28 
Sheep Remaining less less less less less less less and Total 
than than than than than than than over 
$4 $8 $12 $16 $20 $24 $28 
% % % % % % % % % 
0 and less than 10 1.45 1.45 
10 and less than 20 0.48 1.45 1.93 
- 20 and less than 30 0.48 0.48 1.45 0.48 0.48 3.86 7.23 u, 
30 and less than 40 0.48 1.93 1.45 0.97 1.93 2.42 0.97 10.15 
40 and less than 50 0.48 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.93 0.48 2.42 9.66 
50 and less than 60 1.45 3.86 1.93 1.93 1.93 1.45 12.55 
60 and less than 70 0.97 3.38 5.31 0.97 0.48 0.48 11.59 
70 and Jess than 80 0.48 6.76 3.86 3.86 0.48 0.97 16.41 
80 and less than 90 0.48 4.35 3.38 0.97 0.97 10.15 
90 and less than I 00 3.38 3.38 1.93 0.48 9.17 
I 00 and less than 1 10 0.48 2.42 2.42 0.48 0.48 6.28 
l J 0 and over 0.97 0.48 1.93 3.38 
Total 2.41 20.77 26.55 17.86 8.70 7.72 3.86 12.08 99.95(b) 
(a) Sheep equivalents remaining is the number of sheep equivalents which were remaining on the property when the 
data were obtained. (b) Does not add to 100 due to rounding. 
Source: The Data in this table were obtained on a confidential basis from a number of prominent pastoral companies 
in Queensland. 
Table 8 
DISTRIBUTION OF PASTORAL FINANCE COMPANY CLIENTS IN FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES 
BY PERCENTAGE OF SHEEP REMAINING: BY EQUITY RATIO: QUEENSLAND PASTORAL ZONE 
Equity Ratio(%) 
-20 0 20 40 60 80 
Percentage Less and and and and and and 100 
Sheep Remaining than less less less less less less and Total 
-20 than than than than than than over 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
% % % % % % % % % 
0 and less than 10 1.45 - - - - - - 1.45 
10 and less than 20 - - 0.48 0.48 0.48 - 0.48 - 1.92 
20 and less than 30 1.45 - 1.45 1.45 1.93 0.97 - - 7.25 
- 30 and less than 40 0.48 0.48 0.97 3.86 2.42 1.93 - - 10.14 a--
40 and less than 50 2.90 0.97 1.93 1.93 0.97 0.97 - 9.67 
50 and less than 60 2.90 - 2.42 2.42 3.86 0.97 - - 12.57 
60 and less than 70 0.97 0.48 3.38 3.86 0.97 1.93 - 11.59 
70 and less than 80 1.93 0.48 1.93 5.31 4.35 1.93 0.48 - 16.41 
80 and less than 90 0.48 1.93 1.93 0.48 2.42 2.90 - - 10.14 
90 and less than 100 1.93 0.97 0.97 3.38 1.45 0.48 - 9.18 
100 and less than 110 0.48 - 1.45 2.42 1.93 - - - 6.28 
110 and over 0.97 - 0.48 0.48 0.97 0.48 -· - 3.38 
Total 15.94 5.31 17.39 26.07 21.75 12.56 0.96 - 99.98(a) 
(a) Does not add to 100.0 due to rounding. 
Source: The data in this table were obtained on a confidential basis from a number of prominent pastoral companies 
in Queensland. 
Table 9 
Category 'NewLand' Established Total 
Hopeless 630 2,370 (1200 are 3,000 
too small) 
Doubtful (could be 500 3,000-4,000 3,500-4,500 assisted) 
Satisfactory 420 6,280-7,280 6,700-7,700 
Total 1,500 12,650 14,200 (a) 
(a) Total number of cereal and sheep properties in Western Australia. 
Table 10 
ASSISTANCE BY TARIFF, SUBSIDY AND CONCESSIONS TO 
MANUFACTURING AND AGRICULTURE, 1967/68 
Assistance (Est.) 
Workforce 
Assistance per man 
Export Earnings 
Export earnings per man 
Export earnings per $1,000 of assistance 
Manufacturing 
$ 
1 ,700,QOO,OOO 
1,400,000 
1,214 
491,000,000 
350 
288 
Sources: Tariff Board 1970 Commonwealth Year Book, 1969 
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Agriculture 
$ 
500,000,000 
450,000 
1,110 
1,733,000,000 
3,851 
3,466 
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DEBT AND THE VIABILITY OF FARMING IN NEW ZEALAND 
R.J. STANBRIDGE 
Commonwealth Scholar 
I propose to treat this topic in three sections; initially to make a brief 
survey of the current farm debt situation in New Zealand, secondly to inves-
tigate the possibility of a "credit gap" in the agricultural sector, and thirdly 
to make a number of suggestions that I believe will improve the efficiency of 
the farm credit market. 
The Situation 
A debt problem may arise in agriculture from three main causes: 
(i) as a result of the cost-price squeeze holdings will become too small 
to be run ecoqomically. 
(ii) as a result of declining farm profitability, in relation to other 
sectors. 
(iii) as a result of the cost of entry into the farm sector. 
Superficially, the level of debt in the New Zealand farm sector is not 
high. The average level of equity in farm businesses in December 19 70 was 
71.6%, a fall of only 1.4% from the Department of Agriculture's 1963 esti-
mate. Only a quarter of all farmers had an equity of less than 50%. However, 
in 1970 only 11% of farmers had negligible debt in their businesses, compar-
ed with 26% in 1963, and in money terms the rate of increase in debt has 
been high. Since 1963, average mortgage debt per farm has been growing at a 
compound rate of 12%, and non-mortgage debt at a compound rate of 7V2%. 
The rate of increase in cash incomes has obviously not kept up with 
this rate of debt increase. The Agricultural Production Council1 has stated 
that net farm incomes have actually fallen during the production year 
1970/71. Average dairy farm income has fallen from $4,710 in 1969/70, to 
an expected $3,860 in 1970/71, and average sheep farm net income has fall-
en from $6,000 in 1969/70 to an expected $4,500 in 1970/71. 
However, despite these somewhat depressing income trends, we must 
remember two factors. Firstly, in economic theory, capital gain is an income 
concept, and farmers are receiving an imputed income as a result of land 
value appreciation. This has been at a compound rate of about 5% per annum 
since 1963. Secondly, the imprecision of practical application of the "net 
1. Report on the Economic Position of the Farming Industry, (April1971) page 12. 
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income" concept is alarming. To illustrate my point, I suggest that farmers' 
"net income" is a somewhat different calculation to yours or my "net in-
come", and as such, the published figures are an understatement of the real 
net-income position. 
Whilst there has been considerable publicity given to falling farm sector 
net incomes, I feel that we should take far more note of the rate of return on 
capital employed in agriculture, since this is the key factor determining 
efficient resource allocation from the point of view of the economy as a 
whole. Cross-section estimates from the Lincoln College Credit Survey show 
that the average direct rate of return to management, labour and capital on 
assets employed in the farm business was 5.4% in 1969/70. However 60% 
of farmers were observed to be earning less than five per cent, and I would 
suggest that considerable capital being injected into the farm sector, is in the 
economic context, being misallocated. 
We are therefore faced with an agriculture that is facing an increasing 
cost-price squeeze, and a low rate of return on capital employed. In addition, 
the costs of entry to the sector are increasing. The total capital value of the 
average farn1 business in New Zealand has risen from about $43,800 in 1963 
to $87,000 in 1970. 
Traditionally agriculture has been able to finance its own requirements. 
A study of funds flow financial data between 1945 and 1968 does show a very 
close relationship between estimated net cash farm income, and agricultural 
investment. The results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NET CASH FARM INCOME AND 
AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT (1945-68) 
Multiple Relationship Correlation 
Coefficient 
Significance 
NCFI/Farm asset puxchase 
Partial Relationships 
NCFI/Plant and Machinery purchases2 
NCFI/Construction of Buildings2 
NCFI/Purchase of Land 
NCFI/Improvements and Developments2 
.863 
.778 
.906 
.827 
.897 
1% 
N/S 
1% 
5% 
1% 
2. See Johnson, R.W.M. "Capital Formation in N.Z. Agriculture 1946-67" AERU Research Report 
No. 65 (1970) for definitions. 
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However, with inflation in farm business asset values, and a changing 
input mix, an increasing demand for external finance has been observed. 
The magnitude of this increase can be summarised by examination of the 
farm sector financial leverage ratio. This ratio, calculated annually, can be 
envisaged as the ratio of ex-post retained earnings to borrowed funds, necess-
ary to finance expenditure on land purchase, improvements and develop-
ments, buildings and plant and machinery. From a study of the funds flow 
data between 1945 and 1968, we can draw a regression relationship between 
this ratio (X 1) and Time (T). I refer you to equation (1): 
x1 = 2.798- .066 T 1 
where 
X 1 = farm sector financial leverage ratio 
T = Time 
Properties of equation: 
(i) regression coefficient at the 1% level 
(ii) R2(X1T) = .4639; R(X1T) = .6811 
(iii) d = 1.6858 Since ,d=du, we need not reject the hypothesis of 
random disturbance. 
Taking 1945/6 as year 1, then this equation estimates for us that for 
every $2.73 re-invested by the farm sector, only $1 was borrowed. Probably 
of far more significance to us today is that this equation does tell us that, 
on present trends, there is likely to be very little equity financing in New 
Zealand agriculture by the year 1990. 
With this rapidly increasing volume of external credit, together with 
the economic pressures facing the industry, we would expect the farm sector 
to be facing an increasing debt servicing problem. There is little objective 
evidence available to us to assess the validity of such a conclusion, but the 
stock firms certainly have become very alarmed at the .increase in short term 
farm debt. However this concern is not real evidence of a reduction in debt-
servicing ability. Indeed, a study made in February 1971 by the State Ad-
vances Corporation showed that under 2% of its rural account holders had 
received substantial principal or interest suspensions, in the previous two 
years and the majority of these suspensions were made on economic farms 
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that had been affected by normal business hazards, such as drought or dis-
ease, rather than on farms suffering from an acute structural problem. I 
therefore contend that whilst the evidence suggests that there should be a 
debt-servicing problem in the farm sector, this has not been reflected by any 
widespread principal suspensions. 
The Extent of a "Credit Gap" 
It appears that despite the large observed increase in the average amount 
of capital required to finance a farm business, there is little evidence of 
credit shortage for farmers already in the sector. The Lincoln College Credit 
Survey showed that: 
(i) few farmers felt that bank overdraft limits restricted the opera-
tions of their businesses. 
(ii) sixty one per cent of farmers who used bank credit in their busi-
nesses had experienced "no problems" in their dealings with 
banks, and fifty three per cent of those who used stock firm fin-
ance had "no problems". Of those who were experiencing prob-
lems (see Table 2) many were not in the most favourable of finan-
cial positions. 
(iii) very few farmers were experiencing serious problems with their 
mortgagors.· 
However it is important to realise that these are average conclusions. 
There are members of the farm community who are beginning to experience 
serious credit shortages, i.e. prospective purcha~ers and young farmers with a 
heavy debt load. On the basis of current trends, I do think that the problem 
of a "credit gap" in agriculture, whilst not acute at present, is increasingly 
likely to be so. 
I now propose to say a little on the institutions at present supplying 
funds to agriculture, and show why I believe they will be less active partici-
pants in the farm .credit market in the future. 
Trading Banks 
The compound rate of increase in trading bank advances to agriculture 
has been at the rate of 3% per annum since 1957. This compares with a rate 
of increase of 4.9% per annum in all advances. The rate of increase in agri-
cultural lending by the trading banks has therefore been growing at less than 
the average rate. This in itself is not any cause for alarm. Growth and 
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development theory tells us that in any growing economy, such as New Zea-
land's, the role of primary industry will decline relative to secondary and 
tertiary industry. What is more alarming is that agriculture is increasingly 
proving to be an unattractive source of investment for the trading banks. 
This is largely a result of the general financial climate in New Zealand. 
An excess demand for funds from the banking system has arisen as a result 
of the suitability of bank fianance for many projects, and the Government 
controls imposed on the banking system. These controls, by fixing the aver-
age overdraft interest rates at 6%, make bank credit appreciably cheaper 
than the going market rate. Excess demand has meant that first class secur-
ity is available to banks, and they need not look at any proposition that 
does not meet this criteria. This factor has obvious implications for the 
developing farmer with limited security to offer. Borrowers prepared merely 
to pay this 6% rate are of no economic significance to the trading banks. The 
true profitability of any account depends on: 
(i) the rate of interest charged 
. (ii) the amount borrowed 
(iii) the extent of collateral business-deposit or overseas exchange 
business. 
(iv) the timing of advance and deposit flow, compared with the annual 
pattern of demand for and receipts of all funds. On timing grounds 
grounds, agricultural lending ranks favourably. 
Farm deposits are increasing during the Autumn, when the community as a 
whole is experiencing its greatest liquidity shortage, and farm borrowing is at 
a peak in the spring and early summer months, when the rest of the commun-
ity is more liquid. On the other grounds farm lending is not ranked so favour-
ably. Reserve Bank instructions request the trading banks to lend to farmers 
at cheaper rates than other sectors of the community. Assuming that bank-
ers are acting rationally, one cannot therefore be surprised at their looking 
at farm lending unfavourably, when they can get an additional V2-l% on 
their investment to virtually any other sector of the ec·onomy. 
In relation to other sectors of the economy agriculture is therefore 
singularly unprofitable and I suggest that were it not for the distortion 
effects of the two-tier system, bank lending to farmers would have shown a 
decline in recent years. 
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To conclude, despite the operations of the tier system, which is an 
attempt by Government to artificially channel resources into the farm and 
other "priority" sectors, I do believe that the slow rate of increase in bank 
lending to agriculture in recent years is to be expected and if no action is 
taken, is likely to continue. 
Stock Firms 
In contrast to the trading banks, stock firms have played an increasing 
role in the finance of agriculture in recent years. At the present time they 
have some $60m. more outstanding in the farm sector than trading banks. 
Lending money to farmers in itself is a very unprofitable use of stock firms' 
resources. The average costs of capital of two national stock firms, in the 
year ending 30 June 1970, were 9.7% and 8.8% respectively. Lending at 8% 
is therefore tantamount to business suicide. 
If we accept the hypothesis that stock firm farm lending is only a nec-
essary precondition to sales stimulation and retention we would expect 
stock firm lending to increase in times of farming prosperity. 
Following this argument further, when farm incomes are falling, and 
the demand for stock firm goods and services is slacking off, we would 
expect pressure by stock firms on farmers to reduce debt loads. This is 
precisely the current situation-except that stock firms are finding it far 
harder to curtail and cut back on debt, than they did to increase it. The 
problem is therefore that of an increasing volume of hard core debt. 
In Table 2 a classification has been made of the customers of one 
national stock firm, and one regional company. The basis of the "classifica-
tion has been the total number of clients that each firm considers to be its 
"permanent" rather than its casual clients. 
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Table 2 
CLASSIFICATION OF PERMANENT CUSTOMERS AS AT JUNE 1971 
National Regional 
Firm Firm 
(i) Primary Cash 40% 48% 
(ii) Seasonally financed (up to $2,000) 33% 27% 
(iii) Primarily financed (2-7 ,000) 20% 17% 
(iv) Heavily indebted * 
(generally secured) 7% 8% 
*Average debt approx. $10,000 Range from $7-30,000 
Of these permanent clients it can be seen that a very high proportion 
still pay "cash", and only a very small proportion of clients are heavily in-
debted. Such data again reinforces my viewpoint that a debt problem is not 
universal in New Zealand. 
However, even though the percentage of heavily indebted farmers is 
small, the volume of funds involved is large, and stock firms are finding that 
their resources have been misallocated ex-post. This is a result of: 
(i) what has turned out to be essentially long term debt being financed by 
short term working capital sources, that is bank overdraft and farmers' 
depos~ts. 
(ii) the effect of tradition-i.e. allocating credit to a customer just because 
he has been a customer for X years, regardless of the volume of business 
generated. 
With a decrease in profitability within the farm sector, there are internal 
pressures on the stock firms to diversify. Many of these alternative uses of 
funds are far more profitable than agricultural lending and business, and as 
such, must attract funds. I therefore anticipate that the rate of increase in 
farm lending by stock firms in the next few years will.start to fall, as stock 
firms reduce further their relative commitment to agriculture. I suspect that 
this will be through a general tightening up of their credit procedures. I 
cannot see the past casual stock firm-client financial relationship continuing. 
Increasing and stricter use of stock firm limits related to volume of business 
generated are, coming in the industry. Stock firms will substantially increase 
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their percentages of "secured" clients, and insist that the provision of fin-
ance is accompanied by a guarantee of "all business". Many of the tradi-
tional free services provided by stock firms will either be withdrawn, or 
charges imposed, 
All in all, economic circumstances and opportunities elsewhere in the 
economy are forcing stock firms to re-examine their farm finance role. 
Whilst this is a slow process, I believe that they like the trading banks will 
gradually withdraw from providing the short term finance requirements of 
agriculture. 
Long Term Finance 
Before the recent introduction of the Mortgage Guarantee Scheme, 
there were indications that shortages of term finance were appearing. The 
Agricultural Production Council noted in its report that there was evidence 
to suggest that insurance companies and private individuals were reducing 
their commitments to the industry. The Mortgage Guarantee Scheme has the 
effect of turning farm mortgage lending into a gilt-edged proposition earn-
ing market rates of interest. It is still too early to evaluate the success of the 
scheme. However we must remember that if funds are attracted to farming 
it is a result of artificial, rather than real forces. As such the scheme may 
have a possible distorting effect on future resource allocation in the 
economy. 
Despite the Mortgage Guarantee Scheme, the availability of alternative 
investment outlets in the growing economy of New Zealand will inevitably 
force the State to play qn increasing role in farm finance. 
The recent market performance of the State Advances Corporation 
suggests that it is currently following a goal of farm income maximisation. 
A considerable proportion of its funds are now being lent for the purpose 
of structural change, and to a lesser extent for development, rather than for 
purchase. Such a policy does limit the allocation of funds to those already 
within the farm sector and is discriminatory in concept, and by limiting the 
allocation of purchase finance, the Corporation may be precluding the entry 
of new efficient trained farmers into the sector. Even so, the Lincoln Coll-
ege Credit Survey discovered that above all other lending institutions, the 
attitude of the farming community towards the Corporation was entirely 
favourable. 
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We have said that the role of the Corporation is likely to increase in the 
long term credit market, because of the gradual withdrawal of other institu-
tions. Already the Corporation is virtually the monopoly supplier of funds 
for structural change, development and stock purchase. However, the Cor-
poration's funds from National Development Loans Capital, are limited, and 
the Corporation must compete with other sectors for these funds. 
In conclusion, our brief survey of the institutions supplying funds in-
dicates that both current short term and long term sources of finance are 
likely to be attracted away, from the farm sector. This is largely a result of 
the changing importance of agriculture in the growing economy. 
Future Demand 
Turning now to future demand for funds, it would be useful to have 
some idea of the demand for finance by prospective "farmers" contemplat-
ing entry to the sector. This is obviously not possible, as we are unable even 
to identify future "fanners". We can only observe that the increasing capital 
requirements in agriculture, and decreasing sources of internal funds, will in-
crease demand for external finance. 
My comments are largely restricted to future funds demands by farm-
ers already operating within the sector. The Lincoln College Credit Survey 
showed that anticipated future demand for long term finance was largely a 
function of youth and existing low levels of equity. Table 4 shows such a 
relationship and has been drawn up by use of the Attitude Scale technique. 
Table 4 
LIKELY FUTURE LONG TERM BORROWING 
(Sample size - 368) 
Classified response % of respondents Ave equity Modal age group 
(years) 
Very likely 10 48 31-40 
Likely 11 60 21-30 
Possibly 13 63 31-40 
Unlikely 19 66 41-50 
Very unlikely 47 77 61 + 
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This table does give some support to the so-called farm "life cycle" 
hypothesis. Such a conclusion was reinforced by examination of the motives 
of those 66% of all respondents who were unlikely to borrow in the future. 
Of this group, 31% considered that they were too old, 57% that they were 
"satisfied with the present size and state of development of their farm" 
and only 19% that they were pessimistic about the future state of farming in 
New Zealand. This latter should be the prime cause, if economic motivation 
governed farm conduct. 
Questions were also asked in the Survey on the attitude of farmers to 
borrowing for project type purposes-for plant and machinery, for buildings, 
for improvement and development type work, and for heavy expenditure 
in the home. Primarily these questions were phrased in a way to determine 
whether there was any element of debt aversion in the farm sector. The 
Survey discovered that the answer to this question was yes and while the Sur-
vey did not attempt to make quantitative estimates of likely borrowing for 
project type purposes, it did make a number of discoveries. Briefly these 
were: 
(i) that the majority of farmers prefer to finance expenditure on projects 
from their disposable incomes, rather than from borrowing. 
(ii) that few farmers had reached the limits of external credit rationing 
(i.e. limits imposed by institutions). More had reached the limits of in-
ternal rationing (i.e. self imposed borrowing limits). 
(iii) confidence, or lack of confidence in the future of the industry was a 
contributory factor in farmers' willingness ,to borrow for project type 
purposes. 
(iv) active and prospective future borrowers for projects were more likely 
to be running larger businesses with a higher debt load than "non-bor-
rowers". Age was observed t<:! be a major factor in the propensity to 
borrow. 
(v) expenditure on the home was of secondary importance to expenditure 
on the farm. 
I might add that the identification of these factors does provide a basis 
for future quantitative research. 
We are now in a position to return to our original question, and note 
that under current conditions, with the observed supply and demand factors, 
there is likely to be an increasing credit gap in the farm sector. 
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Measures to Improve the Efficiency of the Farm Credit Market 
I now propose to suggest a number of far reaching measures to improve 
the efficiency of the whole farm credit market. These are centred round two 
basic concepts-those of interest rate and of property ownership. I quote 
from a recent OECD report: 
" ,, interest rates are an essential instrument in the economy, guiding 
the distribution of credit as between different sectors. Privileged treat-
ment for any one sector may lead to an uneconomic allocation of 
funds ... " 3 
Agriculture in New Zealand has certainly been a privileged sector in this con-
text-obtaining cheap credit from trading banks, stock firms and the State 
Advances Corporation. As an economist I contend that there is no economic 
case for any one sector receiving subsidised rates. Indeed, if a case is put up 
for such discriminatory rates it should be for new developing industries, of 
which we are not aware of the performance, rather than established sectors 
of the economy, such as agriculture, where we do have a great deal more 
knowledge of future potential. 
I therefore accept that farm sector interest rates must rise in line with 
other rates in the economy. Indeed, trading banks and stock firms agree that 
farmers are not aware of the rates they are paying, and that availability of 
credit is a far more important factor than interest rates. 
The second concept with which I am concerned is that of property 
ownership. I believe that one of the fundamental goals of any farmer is to 
own his land. On the other hand, I believe that one of the fundamental goals 
of a household is to own his own house. If the householder cannot afford 
to buy his house, then is the community going to help him-or is he going to 
have to rent his house. The point I am making is that I do not regard entry 
to farming as a right, and I do not regard farm ownership as a right. I con-
sider it completely inequitable for the rest of the community to assist the 
new farmer to purchase his land, whether it be through tax or interest rate 
concessions, or direct subsidy, when in the ultimate limit, the farmer has 
preserved his standard of living and an asset, and the taxpayer, who has in-
directly paid for this asset, has nothing. I contend that the community's 
willingness to tolerate farm purchase as a right, has led to an upward pressure 
3. "Capital and finance in agriculture". Agric. Policy Report No. 1. OECD. Paris 1970. page 95. 
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on land prices, and a complete disregard, of the economics of land purchas-
ing. In addition, I consider that the refinance requirement every generation 
leads to an additional net injection of capital into the sector, that further 
lowers the rate of return to assets employed. 
I am therefore suggesting that it may be desirable to reconsider the 
whole concept of property ownership. This could be practically expressed 
through a re-examination of the role of the State Advances Corporation. This 
organisation with its highly efficient trained staff has the potential to play a 
dynamic role in the future farm credit market and I suggest that the Corpora-
tion be empowered to buy land voluntarily from farmers wishing to either 
leave or remain in the sector. This would have the effect of at least removing 
labour resources from the sector, and stimulating returns to those still re-
maining. In the first instance, land could be parcelled into economic units, 
and in the second rented back to farmers at "reasonable" (and I do not in-
tend to define reasonable) rents. Rents themselves could be a dynamic device, 
manipulated downwards in time of economic depression and vice versa. In 
addition, I can imagine the Corporation "offering" units to prospective 
applicants, eligibility being based on ability, in much the same way as we 
are offered employment. Implicit in such a state land ownership scheme 
would be the need for job security, and the need for some arrangement for 
full recompense for improvements on the property effected by the tenant. 
Since the Corporation now does provide largely non-purchase finance, fund-
amentally its lending role would not change-rather it would acquire an addi-
tional structural policy role. 
Turning now to problems of short term finance. I consider that the 
trading banks are the right and proper place for the provision of short term 
finance to agriculture. We have shown that the farm sector is at present 
unattractive to the trading banks. I believe that there are two ways of im-
proving this. Firstly, the release of interest rates from their present tight 
controls, and the remova1 of agriculture's present favoured interest rate 
position, would lead to an immediate freer use of the price mechanism as an 
allocative device. In this way, bankers would be at least more favourably 
inclined to rural lending. In the second instance, we have said that banks are 
interested in collateral business. Many farmers currently use their stock firms 
as a "bank", and stock firms currently hold an estimated $60m of farmers' 
deposits. Stock firms have indicated both publicly and privately that they 
do not utilise these deposits in their businesses. Such deposits, if held by the 
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trading bank system, would substantially increase the attractiveness of rural 
sector lending. 
Such a move would reduce the stock firm commitment to agriculture 
and lead to greater efficiency of resource use, both to the stock firms them-
selves, by substantially increasing their liquidity and L'Tlproving their capital 
gearing situation, and the economy at large. I would hope that stock firms' 
credit commitment to agriculture would in future be limited strictly to minor 
seasonal purposes. 
The increasing proportion of time deposits to total deposits in the trading 
bank sector does offer to them the opportunity of injecting medium term money 
into agriculture, given freedom from interest rate control. Longer term de-
posits do enable trading banks to lend on longer term, and not upset their 
capital structure. At present banks are lending on this basis through the 
term loan scheme. Agriculture is not however receiving any great volume of 
these funds, largely as a result of the existing controls and restrictions on the 
trading banks. I suggest that with a relaxation of such controls there is scope 
for increasing bank participation in medium term as well as short term fin-
ance of agriculture. 
To summarise, I have tried to present a brief survey of the financial 
state of agriculture today, future credit trends given current circumstances, 
and suggested measures for improving the efficiency of the whole farm 
credit market. Pressure of time has necessitated brevity, and restriction of 
discussion to the major institutional factors in this market. Some obvious 
exclusions have occurred. I have not for instance, examined the major role 
of private finance in agriculture. even though the Lincoln College Credit 
Survey has shown that 32% of the debt outstanding in the farm sector in 
December 1970 was attributable to private individuals. My major conclus-
ions, can be posed in the form of two questions. Firstly, are we prepared to 
re-examine the whole concept of farm property ownership, and thus help 
to remove a major obstacle in many cases to farm expansion and develop-
ment? And secondly, are we prepared to continue to inject capital into agri-
culture at favourabl~ rates of interest, bearing in mind the possible misalloca-
tion effects to the economy as a whole? I leave these matters for discussion. 
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DEBT AND THE VIABILITY OF 
STORE HILL COUNTRY 
B.W" PARKER, 
Farm Adviser, 
Department of Agriculture, New Plymouth 
There used to be a saying that, "A sheep farmer's problem was not how 
to find money but how to spend it". The situation, you would agree, is some-
what different today. 
It was also said that, "If a farmer can remember what he worried about 
last week, he has a pretty good sort of memory". It is also not quite like that 
today-well not if you are a farmer on store hill country. What you worry 
about this week is the same as what you worried about last week and the 
week before that. Your worry is whether you have got any chance of surviv-
ing or not, whether your life's work will have to be sacrificed. 
There are approximately one million acres of hill country in the Taranaki, 
land district. While not all of this land can be classed as store hill country, 
there are few farms that are fortunate enough in having sufficient easy coun-
try to be classed as finishing farms. The majority of this land is store hill 
country. 
At present it is in financial difficulty. In the early to mid-sixties, this 
hill country was written and spoken about as having a very bright future. 
There was a vast potential for increasing stock numbers. One economist esti-
mated the potential for increased carrying capacity of Taranaki hill country 
alone, to be three and a half million stock units. He also indicated that the 
development of Taranaki hill country would be extremely profitable-and it 
would have been if wool prices had stayed the way they were. 
In my paper I first want to show how far the hill country farmer's 
position has deteriorated. 
What I will do is to compare a typical breeding-ewe/breeding-cow 
enterprise as it was in 1965 with how it is today. In 1965 a breeding ewe 
flock with a 90% lambing and clipping a total of 13V2 lb of wool per ewe re-
turned a gross income of $7 per stock unit. Under today's prices the same 
level of performance brings in $4.60 per stock unit (see Table 1 ). 
While sheep returns have dropped, those of cattle have risen. Before 
the wool price drop a breeding herd with 85% calving, selling steer calves as 
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weaners and surplus female calves as two year heifers, returned the gross in-
come of $4.30 per stock unit. Today the return is $6 per stock unit. 
Table 1 
GROSS INCOME PER STOCK UNIT 1965 and 1970 
Breeding Ewes 
Performance: 90% Lambing 
Total Wool 13~ lb/ewe 
Prices- Wool 
W. Lambs 
2 Th Ewes 
5yr Ewes 
Final Gross Income/S.U. 
Breeding Cows 
Performance: 85% Calving 
Prices- Weaner Steers 
Cull Cows 
Surplus 2 yr Heifers 
Final Gross Income/S.U. 
Farm Basis 
1 cattle beast/ 14 sheep 
1 S.U./2.6 S.U. 
Gross lncome/S.U. 
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1965 1970 
$0.35 $0.20 
$4.00 $3.40 
$8.00 $5.50 
$6.00 $3.50 
$7.00 $4.60 
1965 1970 
$42.00 $60.00 
$50.00 $75.00 
$60.00 $80.00 
$ 4.30 $ 6.00 
Typical Cattle/Sheep Combination-
1965 
$6.20 
1970 
$5.00 
What does this mean on a farm basis? Combining these returns into a 
typical cattle to sheep ration of one beast to 14 sheep shows the overall 
position is a decline in gross income per stock unit from $6.20 to $5.00 or 
a decline of 20%. How this affects the economic farm surplus and the cash 
surplus available for living is shown in Table 2. Because costs are largely in-
flexible, this decline in gross income magnifies itself to a 30% decline in the 
economic farm surplus before depreciation, debt servicing, living expenses, 
taxation and development. 
Farm expenses have been taken as 50% of gross farm income in 1965 
and 55% in 1970. If anything the latter figure is underestimated. Though 
case studies show this percentage, in a lot of cases expenditure has been held 
to below maintenance level. Lump a debt servicing charge of a dollar per 
stock unit and we then have a decline in the cash surplus of 40%. A decline 
of 20% in gross income has magnified itself to a drop of 40%, in the amount 
available for living expenses, taxation and development. 
Table 2 
Gross Income 
Farm Expenses 
Economic Farm Surplus 
Less Debt Serv.* 
Cash Surplus* 
2000 S.U's 
3000 
4000 
5000 
REVENUE PER STOCK UNIT 
1965 
$ 
6.20 
3.10 
3.10 
1.00 
2.10 
4200.00 
6300.00 
8400.00 
10500.00 
NOTE: * Debt servicing includes Interest and Principal 
1970 
$ 
5.00 
2.80 
2.20 
1.00 
1.20 
2400.00 
3600.00 
4800.00 
6000.00 
* Cash surplus is amount left for Personal Expenses, Taxation and Development 
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What does this mean in practice? It means that today 3,500 stock 
units are needed to return the same cash surplus, as 2,000 stock units did in 
1965. That is under an annual debt servicing commitment of a dollar per 
stock unit, 3,000 stock units are now needed in the place of the 2,000. 
These figures also assume that the extra stock units needed today are 
giving the same stock performance-the same calving percentage and lamb-
ing percentage. In actual practice this has not occurred. Increased carrying 
capacity coupled with two poor seasons has given a decline. 
It also assumes that the cattle to sheep ratio has been maintained, but 
because development in stock numbers in a lot of cases was mainly in the 
form of breeding ewes, the ratio is now much wider. 
Having set the stage, I now want to refer to two actual case studies. 
One is typical of the smaller store hill country-a one man property at pre-
sent carrying 2,400 stock units. The second is a larger property employing 
labour and now running 6,000 stock units. In both cases I will compare 
the farm's position in the year immediately before the wool slump ( 1965-66) 
with what it was in the 1969-70 year-the season before last. 
Taking the small property first. A one man unit which in 1965 was 
farming just over 2,000 stock units on 475 effective acres. Today it is run-
ning 2,400 stock units on 500 effective acres. It is representative of the hard-
er type store hill country, steep, fairly broken and predominantly mudstone 
country liable to surface erosion. The story of this property is fairly typical 
of what has happened on many hill country sheep properties over the past 
few years. The increase in carrying has been mainly in the form of sheep 
(see Table 3). Increased numbers coupled with two relatively poor seasons 
and the inability of the farmer to maintain fertilizer rates have resulted in a 
decline in animal performan~e (see Table 4 ). 
STOCK INCREASE 
Table 3 
1965/66 1969/70 
Ewes 1130 1500 
Hoggets 504 515 
B. Cows 52 49 
Other Cattle 77 78 
Total S.D.'s 2070 2400 
S.U.'s/Ac 4.3 4.8 
Cattle/Sheep 1/13 1/16 
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Table 4 
PRODUCTION TREND 
1965/66 1969/70 
Woollbs 16700 16500 
Wool Price 28% 21 
Wool/Ewe 15 n 
L% 80 75 
C% 80 65 
Table 5 
ANALYSIS OF REVENUE 
&fore Now 
'Futuret' 1965/66 1969/70 
Gross Income 
Wool 4700 3470 3400 
Sheep 3550 3050 3100 
Cattle 1800 1630 3300 
Total 10050 8150 9800 
Farm Expenditure 
Fertiliser 2200 1700 1900 
Other 3630 3350 3800 
Total 5850 5050 5700 
Economic Farm Surplus 4200 .3100 4100 
Less Interest 960 1550 1650 
Cash Surplus * 3240 1550 2450 
NOTE: *Cash Surplus is amount left for Personal Expenses, Debt Reduction, Taxation and Devel-
opment. 
t 'Future' -Situation with 1300 B. Ewes, 80 B. Cows and better stock performance 
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Table 5 shows the income position in the two years 1965-66 and 1969 
-70. Actual income and expenditure in each year has been adjusted to a 
status quo by allowing for any change in capital livestock between the start 
and the end of each year and by excluding any expenditure of a capital and 
development nature. Comparative gross income in 1969-70 had fallen to 19% 
below the 196 5-66 level. Farm expenditure had actually been reduced, 
because this farmer had cut back from 80 tons of fertilizer to 50 tons and 
reduced vital maintenance expenditure in fencing and scrub control. The re-
sultant economic farm surplus shows a drop of 26%. Interest charges had in-
creased due to further borrowing required for a new woolshed and the addi-
tional stock. The final cash surplus available for living expenses, debt repay-
ment and development expenses is 52% below what it was in 1965-66. In 
that year it was approximately $3,200. Today it is only $1,500, barely 
enoug..l:J. for living expenses, let alone the $800 principal which the farmer 
should be repaying. 
The obvious question now is "Has this farmer any chance of getting 
back into a viable position?" There is no chance of doing this by further in-
creases in stock units. But the farmer does intend to restructure what he has 
got by reducing sheep numbers and allowing an increase in his breeding cow 
herd. He will also be trying to lift the performance of his stock by better 
feeding and management. 
You might ask "Why weren't cattle increased before this?" Because it 
has really only been in the last year that prices paid for weaner steers have 
risen to the level where breeding cows in Taranaki can now return more per 
stock unit than breeding ewes. Before this the breeding ewe was more pro-
fitable and of course with capitallimiting,more stock units could be put on 
in the form of sheep. 
The farmer has also begun to use rams from a large scale breeding 
scheme. However, the improvement in lambing percentage will be slow and 
the topography will I think, limit it to 85% survival to sale. I have assumed 
that wool weights will rise again to around the level of 13% lb of wool per 
ewe wintered. This will mean the same poundage of wool as produced with 
1,500 ewes in the 1969-70 season, but at a slightly lower price, 20 cents in-
stead of 21 cents. I have also given the farmer a better price for weaner 
steers than he is now getting, $55 average instead of the $48 they averaged 
last year. Overall then, I would say that I am being a little more optimistic 
than pessimistic. 
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What then is the result? It is shown in Table 5 under the heading 
"Future". Total income rises above the 1969-70 level but is still below 
1965-66. Farm expenditure will be up on 1969-70, for I am assuming that 
80 tons of fertilizer is applied again and that adequate repairs and mainten-
ance is possible. Additional costs for cattle over and above sheep need also 
be allowed for. The economic farm surplus in this future improved situation 
would still be lower than 1965-66 and with the higher interest bill the cash 
surplus available for living expenses and debt repayments is still only $2,450 
which is $800 below what it was in 1965-66. Principal repayments of $900 
would allow only $1,550 for actual living expenses. Next year this farmer is 
faced with two children going to boarding school and an additional increased 
cost of $500. 
It is obvious then that an improvement in stock performance will not 
close the gap needed to regain viability on this farm. Unfortunately, amalga-
mation seems to be out of the question. This farmer would have to borrow 
1 00% to acquire extra land and stock and other farms in the district are not 
in a position to be able to take him over. I will leave you with this question 
-"Will this farmer have to walk off his farm?" -because if he does, many 
more will. 
My second case study is of a bigger unit employing labour. Like the 
smaller unit it has also increased stock numbers over the last five. years in an 
attempt to beat the cost/price squeeze. It is typical of the sandstone volcanic 
ash hill country in Taranaki. It is not so steep and broken as the mudstone 
country but initially it is of much lower natural fertility. In the 196 5-70 
period this farmer increased his grazeable area from 1,000 to I ,200 acres. 
Total stock numbers in this period increased from 3,800 stock units to 
6,000 (see Table 6). Breeding ewes have doubled from 2,000 to 4,000. 
Breeding cows have increased by 20% from 109 to 134. Carrying capacity 
per acre rose from 3.8 stock units to 5 stock units. 
Lambing percentage and wool weight per ewe wintered have declined. 
The lambing percentage in-the 1970-71 season reflects the effect of summer 
drought in the previous season. Body weights of ewes at tupping on this 
farm were on average 15 lb below their previous tupping weight. 
Apart from an initial drop, calving percentage is now better than it was 
in 1965. A change in breeding cow management to farming cattle separately 
from sheep has been responsible for this. 
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Table 6 
STOCK INCREASE 
1965/66 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 
Ewes 2000 4120 4250 4000 (+ 100%) 
Hoggets 700 1450 1150 1230 
B. Cows 109 156 125 134 (+ 20%) 
Other Cattle 130 70 100 100 
Total S.D.'s 3800 6200 6100 6000 (+ 60%) 
S.U.'s/Acre 3.8 5.2 5.1 5.0 
Cattle/Sheep 1/9 1/25 
Table 7 
PRODUCTION PROGRESS 
1965/66 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 
Woollbs 29800 44000 45100 43000 (+ 75% 
Wool Price 34.5 23.7 22.3 19.9(45%) 
Wool/Ewe 15 10.5 10.5 10.5 
L% 100 78 81 74 
c% 75 58 74 83 
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While wool weight per ewe wintered has fallen, total poundage ha~, in-
creased by 75% from 29,800lb to 45,100 lb in 1969-70. At the same time 
wool price has fallen by 45% from 34Y:z cents in 1965-66 to 22 cents in 
1969-70 and to 19.9 cents last season. 
An analysis of the actual income and expenditure with each year adjust-
ed to a status quo is shown in (Table 8). Two situations are shown for each 
year. I do this to illustrate the effect of the wool price drop. A 1 is the actual 
position in 1965-66 before development with wool prices at 34Y:z cents. A2 
is the same position but with wool income substituted at the 1969-70 
price of 22 cents. This confirms that this farmer immediately after the wool 
drop obviously had only two alternatives-either to sell out or to keep devel-
oping. B1 is the actual position in 1969-70 after development from 3,800 
stock units to 6,000 stock units. B2 shows what this position would have 
been if wool had stayed at the 24% cents, the price received in 1965-66. 
The analysis shown in Table 8 speaks for itself. The most important 
points to note however are-
(a) That despite an extra 15,300 lb, wool revenue in 1969-70 was 
still below 196 5-66. 
(b) That despite a 60% increase in total stock units carried, total gross 
revenue increased by only 28%. It would have shown a 57% in-
crease if the wool price alone had stayed at its original level. 
(c) Even despite the actual 28% lift in gross revenue the final cash 
surplus left available for living expenses and debt repayment is 
still 25% below what it was in 1965-66. 
The increase in gross revenue has been more than cancelled out by a 
50% rise in farm expenditure and a 40% rise in annual interest commitments. 
Labour and fertilizer were the main items to increase in farm expenses. 
Fertilizer applied increased from 90 tons in 1965 to 130 tons in 1969, but 
the farmer would have liked to have applied 150 tons. This amount would 
have applied the equivalent of half a hundredweight per ·stock unit, recog-
nized as a maintenance requirement on this class of hill country. The 
increase in interest commitments occurred because of the need to borrow 
for development. The sum borrowed amounted to approximately $17 for 
each additional stock unit carried. 
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Table 8 
Income 
Total 
Wool 
Sheep 
Cattle 
Expenditure 
F.W. 
R.&M. 
Vehicle 
O'H&Admin. 
Total 
Farm Surplus 
Less Interest 
Cash Surplus t 
ANALYSIS OF REVENUE 
1965/66 
A1* 
10300 
5900 
3100 
19300 
7140 
600 
1200 
560 
9500 
9800 
4100 
5700 
A2* 
6500 
15500 
9500 
6000 
4100 
1900 
B1* 
10050 
10200 
4500 
24750 
12070 
600 
llOO 
680 
14450 
10300 
6000 
4300 
1969/70 
B2* 
15600 
30350 
14450 
15900 
6000 
9900 
NOTE: t Cash Surplus is amount left for Personal Expenses, Debt Reduction Taxation and 
Development. 
* A1 = Actual situation in 1965/66. Wool Price 34% cent. 
A2 = 1965/66 with wool adjusted to 1969/70 wool price of 22 cent. 
B1 = Actual situation in 1969/70 with wool at 22 cent 
B2 = 1969/70 with wool adjusted to 1965/66 wool price of 34% cent 
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While a comparison of the A2 situation with the B 1 situation definitely 
indicates that the farmer is a good deal better off now than what he would 
have been if he had chosen not to develop, his actual cash surplus in 1969-70 
was still $1,400 below what it was in 1965-66. The frustration of the case is 
that it would nearly have doubled the 1965 surplus if the wool price had 
only stayed where it was. 
The cold facts are that in 1969-70 the cash surplus was still only $4,300 
and this is really over estimating the true position, for farm expenses for that 
year were held to below maintenance. Wool averaged 22.3 cents a pound 
that year. It fell further to 19.9 cents last year. Ifthe 2 cent lower price for 
wool is allowed, plus adequate fertilizer and repairs and maintenance then 
the 1969-70 cash surplus of $4,300 is cut to $2,000. This fam1er has a family 
of four children, two are at boarding school and the other two are at home 
doing correspondence supervised by the farmer's wife. He needs $3,000 for 
personal expense, life insurance, schooling and taxation. He was drawing 
$2,600 a year in 1965 and is still at that level today but only because a lot 
of sacrifices have been made. There is no surplus left for debt repayment. 
Where does this farmer go from here? Like the first case study farmer, 
he will also be trying to obtain better stock performance. His calving percen-
tage, already in the mid-eighties, is good for this class of country, so there is 
not a great deal of scope here. Lambing percentage will improve given better 
summer conditions and no facial eczema. An increase in the cattle to sheep 
ratio could increase income. However, the changeover would mean addition-
al capital which could only come from further borrowing. 
Total stock units cannot be increased unless more land is developed out 
of scrub and bush. This farmer has already developed all of the easier 
country which initially was covered in scattered scrub, gorse and fern. 
Further development would mean tackling heavy scrub and steeper country. 
The return on this today is only marginal and not great enough to tempt 
one who is already highly committed. Like the first case fann this farm 
would find it extremely difficult to sell. This is a large property and as a 
going concern should be worth approximately $120,000. 
The country cannot afford to lose the type of man that this farmer is. 
He is an above average farmer who has had a lifetime of experience develop-
ing hill country. It appears that something will have to be done to retain 
men of this calibre in the industry. 
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You may have heard a saying, "Life depends on Faith, Hope and 
Charity". Six years ago before the wool slump the hill country sheep farmer 
had plenty of faith in his prospects. The last two years he has lived in hope-
hope that the better prices may return. His destiny now appears to depend 
on not hope but charity. Charity in the form of further financial assistance. 
The financial assistance that the hill country farmer is already getting 
is limited mainly to the fertilizer subsidy, but even with the subsidy the cost 
of applying one ton of superphosphate today is only fractionally less than 
what it was in 1965. The applied cost on a farm 40 miles from the fertilizer 
works in 1965 was $26 a ton. Today, with all the subsidies, it still costs 
$24 a ton. 
With the decline in prices and the resulting lower return per stock unit 
hill country farmers cannot afford to apply the fertilizer they need. The 
present subsidy is of very little value to them. It is the dairy farmer and the 
intensive beef farmer, the farmers who can afford fertilizer, who derive the 
most benefit from the subsidy. 
Let me conclude by suggesting that further special assistance is definite-
ly required to keep this store hill country in operation. The amount of assist-
ance that I think is needed is in the vicinity of 60 cents to 80 cents a stock 
unit. This would amount to $3 to $4 an acre on country carrying 4-5 stock 
units an acre. Given adequate stock performance this country today is cap-
able of grossing $20 to $25 an acre. Surely on this basis the economics of 
helping this country are sound. 
If assistance is to be given then the question arises as to the form in 
which it should be implemented. I have mentioned that an acceptable main-
tenance level of fertilizer is around half a hundredweight a stock unit. At 
present it costs approximately $24 a ton or $1.20 a hundredweight for a 
farmer to land superphosphate on the ground. Therefore the cost per stock 
unit is approximately 60 cents which is in the vicinity of the additional 
assistance I estimate is required. If the present subsidies are maintained on 
fertilizer and the present prices do not increase then this additional assist-
ance would mean free fertilizer. Free fertilizer then could be on way of 
channelling the required assistance, but it would have to be tied to a stock 
carrying basis and a system developed to ensure that it finished up only in 
the hands of the sector that requires it-in this case the store hill country 
farmer. 
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Some alternative means of assistance which would also need consid-
ation includes concessional credit in the form of remission of interest and 
specifically tailored suspensory loans. The latter could be made available not 
only to enable future development but to eliminate the debt commitments 
already existing on past development loans. There is also the other alterna-
tive of direct assistance to the farmer, and that is for the state to take over 
the land. 
Any of these actions would obviously need a great deal of study before 
implementation. But before this is done a very urgent answer is needed to 
the question of whether this class of country should remain in farming. 
The answer to that must surely depend on how valuable a store stock 
industry is to the national economy. 
45 
46 
DEBT AND THE VIABILITY OF THE CANTERBURY FARMER 
JOHN TA VENDALE, 
Farm Management Consultant, Ashburton 
It is believed by many that the Canterbury plains land farmer has been 
able to withstand the effect of the cost/price spiral better than other areas. 
The following paper may or may not confinn this opinion. 
Our Consulting practice in Mid-Canterbury has, for a number of years, 
prepared an analysis of annual accounts based on soil type and rainfall and it 
is this analysis which forms the basis of this paper. 
The following are the six broad groups used in our analysis: 
1. Light Land Low Rainfall 
2. Lighter Medium Some Crop 
3. Medium Land Moderate Rainfall 
4. Medium Land Hig.~ Rainfall 
5. Medium Heavy land 
6. Heavy Land 
Average returns over the past four years 1965/66-1969/70 have indica-
ted the following between groups trends (Table 1 ). 
It should be noted that the capital value of the land was based on the 
1966 Government Valuation and that the most recent valuation (Aprill971) 
showed an average increase of 25%. The ranking of groups in the order shown 
was virtually static throughout the period and at no time was there a marked 
difference in the between group comparisons as shown, i.e. the effect of the 
1970 drought was apparently evenly spread among all groups. 
These percentages of total capital figures indicate the current yields 
being obtained by farmers in this area and could be regarded as satisfactory 
when the capital gains which have occurred in land values over this period 
are considered. However, capital gains appear likely to slow down and for 
this reason returns for the first three groups give some concern. 
Increased production and improved land utilization is recorded in all 
groups but returns have shown only a moderate improvement and it has only 
been the increase in the physical productivity which has ensured the results 
achieved. 
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Farm amalgamation and an increase in farm size has often been 
reported as the way to improve returns in the future and as a result Table 
2 which relates productivity from the largest and smallest farms in the 
various groups will be of interest. These figures are based on returns for the 
1968/69 and 1969/70 seasons only as no previous records of individual farm 
sizes had been kept. 
The interesting trend in this table is that although increased returns on 
capital are shown for all groups except the medium high rainfall group in 
both years and the heavy land group in one year by increasing the farm size, 
in all instances except for one year in the heavy land group the gross profit 
per acre was below the average for the group. The effect of size on the levels 
of total expenditure per acre is clearly shown to have the greater impact on 
profitability when farm size is increased at the expense of a decline in gross 
profit. It could be assumed from this table that whilst larger farms will in-
crease the viability of the individual farm and farmer, gross profit per acre 
or the productivity per acre is lowered and the total level of production falls. 
There would, in my view, be no class of farming where the individual's 
management and husbandry skills have such a tremendous influence on the 
financial returns obtained, than on the semi-intensive arable farms in Canter-
bury. Table 3 indicates the returns obtained by farmers who are consistently 
below or above average for three of the six groups. 
The table clearly indicates the reward for managerial skill in the typical 
Canterbury environment with the smallest difference between the two levels 
of management being the 100% in the medium moderate rainfall, and the 
greatest 180% in the light land group. This latter figure has been accentuated 
by the sharp effect which drought had on those farmers with below average 
managerial ability. 
Current lending policies by Government bodies and to some extent by 
other sources of mortgage finance clearly favour the amalgamation of 
smaller units. The figures presented in Table 2 give some indication that lend-
ing for an increase in farm size is warranted, but of primary consideration in 
all farm lending is the ability of the farmer to service the debt. 
Table 4 indicates the return on the farmer's own capital under a variable 
debt situation in association with varying levels of managerial skill. It is only 
in the heavy land group that a positive return is shown at all levels of 
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managerial skill and indebtedness. These returns are all prior to any taxation 
debt reduction, or depreciation. 
Clearly with most current mortgages requiring 3% capital repayments 
the ability of farmers to service current debt charges is not high. In Table 4 
only the above average farmer in the heavy land group is capable of earning 
more than current interest rates on his share of the total capital involved, and 
when one considers that State Advances lending is at an interest rate of 8% 
and that table mortgage lending on a 20 and 25 year term amounts to 9.3% 
and 10.1% the ability of farmers to meet such charges in the current econom-
ic situation is indeed slender. It should be remembered also that hard core 
debt problems are more likely to arise in that group of farmers who have 
shown below average returns in the past. 
Unfortunately many hard core problems also exist from inadequate 
financial advice in the past and as a result of capital purchases and develop-
ment expenditure incurred in the post National Development Conference 
period. 
It is obvious that a complete re-appraisal of farm lending is required and 
much more emphasis must be placed on past performance of the farmer and 
expected returns. Borrowing in the past has been based primarily on the 
borrower's equity and it is this latter term which in my view requires ampli-
fication. Despite the returns shown (Table 1) farmers have purchased larger 
units and increased the1r present unit at prices which have resulted in are-
valuation of the Ash burton County at a level 25% in excess of its previous 
value. Many have been able to borrow increased amounts of money on the 
basis of the improvement in their equity. However, it should be remember-
ed that this process is self-perpetuating, and in fact equity is based on the 
buyer of land be he ill informed or not. Equity is not in my view a sound 
base for lending for either the mortgagee or mortgagor. I would much prefer 
to see mortgage lending based on a 1 0% return on all capital invested after 
wages of management and taxation, even though this would probable bring 
land prices down sharply and threaten the present existence of many 
farmers. 
I would also prefer to see an increase in the number of long term flat 
mortgages made available to the farmer. Industry does not return capital to 
its investors and it can well be reasoned that farming is at a distinct disad-
vantage in this respect. Development loans are one area of farm lending 
where I believe flat mortgages would have advantages. 
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Similarly, the current refinancing through the State Advances Corpor-
ation should, in my view, have been based on a flat mortgage system. The 
reason why such lending is necessary is the inability of the farmer to pay 
an interest rate of 71h% and repay capital as well, yet he will be required 
to meet charges of at least 9.3% when borrowing money for this purpose 
from the State Advances Corporation. The endeavours to restructure pre-
sent current account debts to a long term basis whilst being commendable, 
in my view ignore a basic requirement of farming at this moment. 
The average return on money inviested in farming today is not high 
enough (see Table 1) and profitability of the average New Zealand farmer 
must be improved if farming is to remain the lifeblood of the nation. The 
figures I have presented to you indicate the inability of the farmer to satis-
factorily service an increasing debt load, and both farmers and their ad-
visers should consider seriously the short term implications of an increase 
in the rate of fixed charges when further borrowing is being contemplated. 
The cost of restoring profitability to farming will be high and will lead to 
many inequalities. However, it is essential that returns are improved if in-
vestment is to be maintained. 
Recently cost subsidies have been introduced to some areas of farm 
expenditure. It is my belief that if farm incomes are to increase and 'on 
farm' returns to capital are to improve then product subsidies should be 
introduced. Product subsidies are selective and favour the farmer who is at 
present making the best use of his resources. They will also speed up the 
rationalisation whithin the industry in regard to farm size. The present 
internal cost structure is such that the introduction of product subsidies is 
not a matter of 'if but 'when' 
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Table 1 
AVERAGE RETURN ON CAPITAL 1965/66-1969/70 
Total Farm Capital Gross Profit Real Profit % Total Farm Capital 
$/acre $/acre $/acre 
Light Land Low Rainfall $153 $30.9 $ 6.4 4.2% 
Light Medium Some Crop $174 $36.2 $ 7.6 4.4% 
Medium Land Moderate Rainfa 
Rainfall $175 $39.2 $ 8.7 5.0% 
Medium Land High Rainfall $166 $42.0 $10.6 6.4% 
Medium Heavy Land $234 $522 $ 13.0 5.6% 
"' 
Heavy Land $288 $65.6 $21.1 73% 
-
Table 2 
RETURNS AND FARM SIZE 
Light Land Low Rainfall Area Total Farm Gross Real Real %Return 
Capital/acre Profit Expenses Profit on T.F.C. 
1969/70 
Large 1125 $141 $27.7 $21.4 $ 6.3 4.5 
Small 487 $168 $33.5 $30.1 $ 3.4 2.0 
Average 705 $167 $28.8 $25.1 $ 3.0 1.8 
1968/69 
Large 1086 $123 $34.0 $23.4 $10.6 8.6 
Small 484 $155 $33.1 $27.9 $ 5.2 3.4 
"" Average 710 $145 $34.2 $25.2 $ 9.0 6.2 
"' 
Light Land Some Crop 
1969/70 
Large 1055 $145 $34.0 $28.9 $ 5.1 3.5 
Small 351 $190 $39.2 $30.0 $ 9.2 4.8 
Average 615 $203 $37.8 $31.2 $ 6.6 3.3 
1968/69 
Large 1037 $135 $37.5 $23.8 $13.7 10.1 
Small 355 $179 $38.6 $29.9 $ 8.7 4.9 
Average 667 $161 $38.8 $29.8 $ 9.0 5.7 
Table 2 
RETURNS AND FARM SIZE 
Area Total Farm Gross Real Real %Return 
Medium Land Moderate Rainfall Capital/acre Profit Expenses Profit on T.F.C. 
1969/70 
Large 1005 $146 $36.3 $26.2 $10.1 6.9 
Small . 366 $192 $42.7 $35.2 $ 7.5 3.9 
Average 595 $176 $41.8 $33.6 $ 8.2 4.8 
1968/69 
Large 889 $150 $39.7 $29.5 $10.2 6.8 
Small 419 $180 $44.3 $33.6 $10.7 6.0 
01 
Average 566 $174 $43.5 $32.1 $11.4 6.5 
w 
Medium Land High Rainfall 
1969/70 
Large 1134 $155 $36.2 $28.2 $ 8.0 5.1 
Small 377 $184 $52.1 $36.1 $16.0 8.7 
Average 600 $175 $47.7 $36.4 $11.3 6.5 
1968/69 
Large 1050 $175 $37.5 $26.3 $11.2 6.4 
Small 373 $167 $49.7 $32.2 $17.5 10.5 
Average 606 $166 $46.0. $33.1 $12.9 7.7 . 
Table 2 
RETURNS AND FARM SIZE 
Area Total Farm Gross Real Real %Return 
Medium Heavy Land Capital/acre Profit Expenses Profit on T.F.C. 
1969/70 
Large 775 $207 $47.9 $38.5 $ 9.4 4.5 
Small 320 $315 $62.4 $48.7 $13.7 4.4 
Average 492 $250 $52.0 $41.4 $10.6 4.3 
1968/69 
Large 790 $199 $52.3 $36.0 $16.3 8.2 
Vl Small 317 $230 
.j:>. $52.6 $42.3 $10.3 4.5 
Average 512 $226 $56.4 $40.3 $16.1 7.2 
Heavy Land 
1969/70 
Large 621 $270 $66.7 $46.4 $20.3 7.5 
Small 258 $298 $67.2 $48.3 $18.9 6.3 
Average 424 $281 $68.0 $45.5 $22.5 8.0 
1968/69 
Large 560 $270 $75.4 $46.1 $29.3 10.8 
Small 237 $313 $71.5 $43.5 $28.0 9.0 
Average 360 $292 $71.9 $47.9 $24.0 8.2 
Table 3 
RETURNS AND MANAGEMENT 
Light Land Low Rainfall Medium Land Moderate Rainfall Heavy Land 
Good Average Fair Good Average Fair Good Average Fair 
Manage- of Man~tge- Manage- of Manage- Manage- of Manage-
ment Group ment ment Group ment ment Group ment 
Gross Profit/ac. $38.6 $30.9 $28.8 $42.8 $39.2 $38.0 $65.6 $65.6 $54.7 
Real Profit/ac. $10.9 $ 6.4 $ 3.5 $12.2 $ 8.7 $ 6.1 $26,7 $21.1 $12,7 
Total Capital/ac. $166 $153 $150 $165 $175 $171 $236 $288 $252 
%Total Capital 6.5% 4.2% 2.3% 7.4% 5.0% 3.7% 11.3% 7.3% 5.0% 
V1 % Gross Profit 
V1 Retained 28% 21% 12% 28% 22% 16% 41% 32% 23% 
Table 4 
DEBT SERVICING 
Total Farm Average Return Interest Return on own Investment 
Capital %T.F.C. at Debt Levels of:· 
$/acre 30% 40% 50% 
Light Land Low Rainfall 
Average $153 4.2% 1.95% 1.20% 0.45% 
Below Average $150 2.3% 0.05% ·0.70% -1.45% 
Above Average $166 6.5% 4.25% 3.50% 2.75% 
Medium Land Moderate Rainfall 
Average $175 5.0% 2.75% 2.00% 1.25% 
"' 0\ Below Average $171 3.7% 1.45% 0.70% -0.05% 
Above Average $165 7.4% 5.15% 4.40% 3.65% 
Heavy Land 
Average $288 7.3% 5.05% 4.30% 3.55% 
Below Average $252 5.0% 2.75% 2.00% 1.25% 
Above Average $236 11.3% 9.05% 8.30% 7.55% 
DEBT AND THE VIABILITY OF FARMING 
IN NORTHLAND 
R.H.KIRTON 
Dairy Board Consulting Officer, Warkworth 
The soils, climate, hi~tory and production trends of the North Auckland 
·. peninsula differ greatly from other areas of New Zealand. 
Even from a cursory examination of the history of the Northern penin-
sula one cannot fail to conclude that it was the timber, the Kauri gum and 
the flax of Northland which laid the foundations of Auckland, just as it is an 
inescapable conclusion that this attractive colonial phase ultimately impover-
ished and depressed the North. The combination of capital starvation, and 
for very many years, seemingly insurmountable technical problems, sapped 
the initiative and confidence of those who staked their future in the North. 
In the early fifties most of New Zealand experienced a few years of 
boom conditions. Northland missed out for three main reasons. First, too 
many basic problems of soil fertility were not yet solved. Secondly, farming 
was still at sustenance level, and there was not enough cash left over for 
development. Thirdly, neither the inhabitants, nor the financiers, had any 
real confidence in the area as a future economic producer of agricultural pro-
ducts. 
The real break through came in 19 53 when the Government started a 
massive land development programme. This development has not only pro-
duced new farms from waste land but has brought about improvements and 
extensions in roads, telephone and electric power services. It has revitalized 
the towns and city and above all has renewed confidence in all who live and 
work in the area. The physical and fertility problems of the soils have been 
overcome by off pasture wintering and correct and sufficient topdressing. 
The climate and contour are ideal for grassland and livestock farming. The 
greatest need is still capital and the area is still far from generating enough 
for its own development. · 
It must be realised that there are some very good reasons why North-
land's costs of production are higher than some other areas. From the New 
Zealand Dairy Board's 1968-69 Survey - the average dairy farm in New Zea-
land is 168 acres of which 143 are farmed. In North Auckland the average 
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is 250 acres of which 182 are fanned. As well as having greater areas to 
attend to, the stocking rate per 100 acres is also lower with 52 cows compar-
ed with the North Island average of 74 cows, milk fat per labour unit is 
16,410 lbs compared with 19,320 North Island average. The number of cows 
milked per labour unit is very similar at 67 cows for North Auckland and 68 
for the North Island. The output per farm at 23,350 lbs is well below the 
North Island figure of 30,050 lbs. 
To summarize this section, Northlanders have a far greater area to farm, 
a lower stocking rate, and less production per cow. The number of cows 
handled per labour unit is virtually the same, but milk fat per labour unit is 
lower. 
The survey figures also show that in Northland 51 per cent of farms had 
an income under $3,000 compared with the North Island average of 31 per 
cent. 
The fanners also have much less equity at 61 per cent compared with 
the North Island average of 66 per cent. 
By now you may feel that I hold little hope for the futre of Northland 
but I do in fact believe that providing certain things happen, then a bright 
and sound future is assured. Various research workers have studied the posi-
tion with regard to the future requirements of the area. In 196 7 McArthur 
at the Grasslands Conference in Whangarei gave his findings regarding the 
best use of capital inputs. He found that the greatest return on money at 
this stage was into existing farms rather than developing new ones. Capital 
expenditure on such items as off pasture feeding areas, fertilizer and lime, 
access, fencing and water supply, coupled with increased stocking rate, show-
ed the fastest increas in net profit. 
I would at this stage like to congratulate the S.A.C. on the magnficent 
job they have done, and are doing in the area. An extension of their present 
activities on an even broader scale would answer most of the area's needs. 
Private money is almost unobtainable, insurance finance has often been 
very difficult to obtain and is operated on a stop-go policy which is very hard 
to understand at times. Banks generally do not seem to have kept pace with 
the changes in dairying progress and farmers requirements for season over-
drafts. Their attitude towards stock loans is archaic to say the best. Generally 
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banks will not lend more than 30 per cent of a conservative stock valuation 
and so tie up much asset value for very little loan money. 
A great deal of farm equipment finance is provided by hire purchase 
firms. The rate of interest is usually high and this forces the users to pay 
back large amounts of capital which in tum increases the tax bill and lessens 
the amount of money available for further farm development. 
It is a pity that many farmers have failed to appreciate that S.A.C. fin-
ance would have been available, had it been applied for. Items such as cow 
sheds, milking machines and tractors could on occasions have been financed 
in this way. It seems that the much easier application systems with hire pur-
chase firms has an appeal. Several possible alterations or amendments to the 
present system could be implemented. The ease and speed of obtaining hire 
purchase money, as compared with the slowness of obtaining an S.A.C. 
loan, often virtually forces farmers in to hire purchase when urgent decisions 
are needed to be made, (i.e.) a sudden break down of tractor or milking 
machine. 
What is needed is for local officers of the S.A.C. (or possibly selected 
members of other advisory organizations) to be able to give instant accept-
ance or rejection for loans of this type up to certain limits. 
It is to be hoped that extra provision for loans on both middle and 
short term is going to be made by the government. In the very near future 
the dairy industry faces a very large expenditure on upgrading its milking 
plants to stainless steel, and the installation of cow shed waste disposal units. 
As the benefits from both of these items will be National, rather than indiv-
idual, it seems reasonable that long term S.A.C. loans should be made avail-
able. 
I will now give brief histories of two fairly typical farms in my area, 
these are not rare instances, but are typical of many such cases. 
Farm No.1 
Total area 139 acres, farmed area 137 acres. Prior to the property being 
taken over for dairying in 1959/60 it had been used as a runoff. The first two 
seasons saw production around 10,000 fat per year. Then through falling 
fertility, because of a lack of topdressing, and overstocking, production drop-
ped to 8,463 lbs. 
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At this stage the farmer obtained extension advice and applied to S.A.C. 
for development finance, for topdressing, stock and plant. The following sea-
son production doubled to 16,848 lbs and has continued to rise each season 
since, to an all time high in 1970/71 of 30,230 lbs. 
As the farm is becoming too small to operate successfully as a self-con-
tained unit, the owner is at this time negotiating through S.A.C. to purchase 
an adjoining 7 5 acres which he greatly needs. 
1959-62 Production 10,000 lbs B.F. 
1963-64 Production 8,463 lbs B.F. 
1964-65 Production 16,845 lbs B.F. 
1965-66 Production 20,794 lbs B.F. 
1966-67 Production 22,102 lbs B.F. 
1967-68 Production 24,776 lbs B.F. 
1968-69 Production 25,182 lbs B.F. 
1969-70 Production 28,836 lbs B.F. 
1970-71 Production 30,227 lbs B.F. 
Year Property Value Assets over Profit or Tax 
Liabilities Loss 
1962-63 $ 6,870 $1,780 $-800 $144 
1965-66 $16,200 $ 620 $ -63 $144 
1967-68 $17,450 $-623 $-2,216 H.P. $1,131 
1969~70 $28,400 $9,565 $-560 $300 
Stock are in at Book Value 
Owner's Equity 1962-63 11% 
Owner's Equity 1969-70 30% 
It is important to realise that an input of an extra $3,440 increased pro-
duction by 100 per cent. 
Farm No.2 
The total area of this farm is 597 acres. Three hundred and thirty-three 
acres are now in grass and this accounts for the virtually all the wheeled 
tractor area. The remainder is fairly steep and covered in light bush. In 1967 
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it became obvious that the farm could not survive any longer as a sheep unit, 
so finance was obtained from S.A.C. for a change to dairying. 
In the 1968/69 season 80 dairy cows and 500 breeding ewes were run. 
The cows produced only 20,000 lbs fat and the ewes only 350 lambs. The 
total loss on the year's working was $4,600. This included the loss on the 
ewes sold. 
The following year 1969/70, 160 cows were milked, production was 
only 25,000 fat, but cattle sales were very good and the final result was a 
loss of only $320. This last season 170 cows were milked for 33,700 lbs fat 
and again cattle sales have been good. Although the balance sheet is not yet 
available it appears that finances are very much healthier, with a profit of 
$2,542. 
Season 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
Production 
20,000 fat, 350 lambs 
25,000 cattle 
33,700 cattle 
Drawings$ 
1,560 
1,366 
Missing 
1,436 ) 
Sales$ 
-2,630 
4,660 
6,720 
1 ,431 ) Farm workers keep included 
Tax has been virtually nil and life insurance $53,00 
Profit/Loss 
4,600 
-320 
2,542 
In this case the input of an extra $9,600 has changed a certain sheep 
farming bankruptcy into a dairying success. 
What I have said so far is now history and is a summary of what has 
happened during a period of depressed prices for dairy products and from an 
area where land development has lagged behind other more easily developed 
areas. Because of increased costs during Northland's period of advancement 
and the added soil problems to be overcome, total costs per acre have been 
high. Despite these disadvantages the area has shown that even in times of 
depressed prices, it is capable of progress. 
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Changes in herd and farm size have had to be made in many cases. The 
assistance of S.A.C. has been profound, it has often been the only source 
where credit worthy farmers could get extra finance to either further develop 
their present units, or for the amalgamation~f marginal and uneconomic 
units. Changes from uneconomic sheep units to viable dairy units, have also 
been successfully undertaken as shown. The value, especially to developing 
areas, of Government subsidies on topdressing, freight, weed sprays and 
drenches should not be underestimated. If, as has been shown the more diffi-
cult areas to farm, have been able, to make reasonable progress even with de-
pressed prices and poor seasons, then the dairying industry given a reasonable 
financial climate should be able to make sound and steady growth in the 70's. 
As herds get larger, labour more difficult to obtain and social demands 
greater, it is obvious that there is a great national need for successful farms 
to be able to expand. To do this, the limits oflending by the S.A.C. will 
have to be greatly increased so that the industry can remain in a competitive 
position. Now that interest rates have been put up to 8 per cent, which is 
equal to the previous interest plus repayment rate, on long term loans, it 
raises the question of the adequacy of the present farm lending policies. 
In business, other than farming, the capital which is owned by the 
shareholders, is obviously, never repaid, so the annual cost is interest only. 
In farming, in the last analysis, the land belongs to the State. Considering 
this fact, would it not be practicable for the loan to remain on the land as a 
flat mortgage and not need to be repaid by each successive occupant unless 
he so desired. If capital repayment was not required then more money 
would automatically become available for reinvestment, and it would greatly 
improve the possibility of top sharemilkers graduating to large farm owners. 
If agricultural production is vitally needed in New Zealand it must be 
possible to implement changes to the financial structure of the industry so 
that the greatest increases can be obtained at the lowest cost in a minimum 
of time. -
If these changes to the financial structure become a reality, and if the 
money is directed in the correct order of priorities, then the increases in 
farm production in Northland could easily exceed 50 per cent of that now 
being obtained. 
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At this time the prices for dairy products for the next few years look 
quite good, and provided costs can be held at reasonable limits, then there 
is every reason for farmers to have confidence in their industry. 
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